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Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

MAY 1 4 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

RE: S t a t e v . Dunn Case No. 17571
Dear Mr. B u t l e r ,

Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I am writing to bring the Court's attention to supplemental
authorities pertaining to questions asked during oral argument on
the above referenced case.
On page 35 of his Opening Brief, Mr. Dunn argued that his
attorney at trial was ineffective for failing to request a
compulsion instruction informing the jury that it was the State's
burden to show that Mr. Dunn was not compelled and not Mr. Dunn's
burden to prove the affirmative defense. During oral argument,
the Court asked whether the law was clear, at the time of Mr.
Dunn's trial in 1980, that such an instruction was necessary.
Mr. Dunn wishes to direct the Court's attention to Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975), both of which prohibit jury instructions which might
cause a jury to infer that some part of the burden of proof has
been shifted to the defendant. Mr. Dunn also wishes to direct
the Court's attention to United States v. Corrigan, 548 F.2d 879,
883 (10th Cir. 1977) where the court ruled that in the case of
affirmative defenses, a specific, clear jury instruction on the
burden of proof is necessary. In Corrigan, the court reversed
the defendant's conviction after concluding that the jury might
have inferred that the burden of proving self-defense was on the
defendant.
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On page 7 of his Reply Brief, Mr. Dunn argued that the trial
court's reversal of its decision to exclude Mr. Dunn's prior
conviction, after Mr. Dunn had taken the witness stand, was
prejudicial and a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. During oral argument, the Court asked
whether counsel had found any cases in which an amendment or
modification of a prior ruling had been held prejudicial. Mr.
Dunn would like to direct the Court's attention to two United
States Supreme Court cases; Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S.
189 (1942) and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
In Johnson, the trial judge had incorrectly allowed the
defendant to assert his privilege against self-incrimination and
later allowed the prosecution to comment on the assertion of the
privilege. The Court concluded that even though the judge could
have denied the privilege thus making the prosecutor's comments
proper, the defendant had relied on the erroneous ruling and
therefore the judge should have disallowed the prosecutor's
comments. 316 U.S. at 198-99. The Court did not reverse the
conviction because although the defense attorney originally
objected to the prosecutor's comments, that objection was withdrawn and never renewed.
In Doyle, the Court reversed a conviction where the prosecution had used the defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach the
defendant on cross-examination. The Court ruled that the defendant's silence might have been the result of reliance on the
implication in the Miranda warning that there would be no penalty
if the defendant chose to remain silent. 426 U.S. at 618-19. The
dissent in Doyle characterized this argument as having "some of
the characteristics of an estoppel theory." Id. at 620.
Your attention to this matter is appreciated.
Vepjf truly yours,

r9r/W_

>ra Jy^Moore
D J M : j m

cc:

.

-••>•

, ....

Christine F. Soltis, Esq.
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February 3/ 1986

Mr. Geoffrey Butler
Court Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re: Rose v. Allied Development Company
Case No. 19488
Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure/ please be advised that the case of Broussard v. Caci/ Inc./
121 L.R.R.M. 2282 (1st Cir. 1986) supports the contentions in
defendant-respondent's brief at pages 8-14 and 30-33.
Sincerely/

David A. Anderson
DAA:dll
Enclosure
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Clerk, Suprema Court, Utah

121 LRRM 2282
We find no persuasive evidence in
either the plain words or legislative
history of ERISA or the MPPAA that
Congress intended section 515 to be an
exception to the general rule of NLRB
preemption for that narrow category
of suits seeking recovery of unpaid
contributions accrued during the period between contract expiration and
impasse. Therefore, the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Advanced must be affirmed.

BROUSSARD v. CACI, INC.
U.S. Court of Appeals,
First Circuit (Boston),
BROUSSARD, et al. v. CACI, INC.
— FEDERAL, et al.. No. 85-1648, January 2, 1986
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
1. Wrongful discharge — General
rule*178.510>172.07
Contract of employment in Maine
for indefinite length of time is terminable at will by either party, unless
parties clearly state their intention in
express terms that discharge shall be
only for "good cause."
2. Wrongful discharge — 'Goodcause' covenant •172.07 •170.510
Employer's representations to discharged employee that employee
would have work through 1986, that it
was hiring him for a career, and that
employee would have long-term employment if he did a good job do not
approach express undertaking to
guarantee that employee could be discharged only for "good cause."
3. Wrongful discharge — Fraudulent concealment •170.510 •170.65
•172.0812
Employee who was discharged for
unsatisfactory performance before exAdvanced asserts that Impasse was reached, or.
If not, that the unions waived their bargaining
rights, thus permitting Advanced to make unilateral changes in working conditions, but admits
that the NLRB has never accepted this argument.
Advanced suggests that since the duty to bargain
in good faith created by §8(d) of the NLRA is
mutual, a union that breaches this duty should
not be permitted to complain about the employers
unilateral changes in working conditions Determining the merits of this argument is initially a
matter for the NLRB We, however, note that Advanced concededly made no payments after the
day of expiration of the collective agreement.
Since Advanced apparently breached 5§8(d) and
8(aX5) before the unions can possibly have waived
their rights, it seems unlikely that Advanced could
successfully defend a properly documented unfair
labor practice charge See Katz, 369 U S at 741-42.

BROUSSARD v. CACI, INC.
piration of his alleged three-year employment relationship failed to state
claim for misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment, where employer was
under no affirmative duty to disclose
that its policy was to discharge employees at will.

Appeal from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Maine. Affirmed.
William I. Cowin (Friedman & Atherton, with him on brief), Boston,
Mass., for appellants.
George Z. Singal (Gross, Minsky,
Mogul & Singal, P.A., and Micheal S.
Friedman, Jeffery P. Elefante, Virginia G. Watkin, Douglas S. Abel and
Covington & Burling with him on
brief), Bangor, Maine, for appellees.
Before COFFIN and BREYER, Circuit Judges, and WYZANSKI,* Senior District Judge.
Full Text of Opinion
COFFIN, Circuit Judge: — This is a
case of parties entering into a relationship with unarticulated and contradictory assumptions resulting in frustrated expectations. This is also a case
which, though terminating in a summary judgment for defendants, has
been anything but summary in the
quantity of counts pleaded, depositions, affidavits, exhibits, and layers of
judicial attention. Accordingly, we
shall be brief in indicating the reasons
for our affirmance on the judgment
below.
The breach of contract count (Count
I) began as an allegation that plaintiff
was fired in violation of defendant CACI's personnel policies, that he was not
given a minimum of three years employment as promised, and that his
discharge was in breach of an implied
covenant of fair dealing. This set of
claims has metamorphosed into a
present claim that "the parties entered
into an indefinite employment arrangement subject to an understanding that Broussard would not be term i n a t e d a r b i t r a r i l y / ' (Appellant's
brief, p. 17)
[1J Under Maine law, "a contract of
employment for an indefinite length of
time is terminable at will by either
party", Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hospital, 379 A.2d 135, 137, 115
LRRM 4358 (Me. 1977) (emphasis in
original), unless the parties "clearly
stat(el their intention" in "express

* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by
designation.
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terms*' that a discharge shall be only
for good cause. Larrabee v. Penobscot
Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97, 99-100, 118
LRRM 2489 (Me. 1984). In the latter
case the court made clear that a promise, merely implied, not to fire without
good cause, was inadequate. Id. at 99.
[2J In this case the representations
made to plaintiff by CACI — to the
effect that CACI would have work in
Bath "roughly through 1986", that it
was "hiring him for a career . . . n o t . . .
under the body shop technique", that
"there was Isic] no restraints on what
he could or could not do professionally
and financially with CACI", and that
"if he did a good job he would have
long-term employment" — do not approach an express undertaking to
guarantee that plaintiff could be discharged only for good cause. In the
euphoria of initial negotiations, plaintiff's expectations of tenure may well
have been reinforced by these representations, but his expectations could
not be held to have been created by
these representations.
The difference between puffery and
promise is preserved by the Maine
cases we have cited. Employment negotiations resulting in employment
are by definition conducted in an atmosphere of optimism and mutual
hope. The air is redolent with expectation of duration on the part of the
employee and of satisfactory performance by the employer. But to equate
general expressions of hope for a long
relationship with an express promise
to discharge only for good cause would
effectively eliminate Maine's rule, severe though it may be, that contracts
for indefinite employment are, without more, terminable at will.'
So concluding, we need not address
the questions whether the undertaking was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds or whether such a defense was precluded by equitable
estoppel. Our silence on these issues,
however, does not imply any disagreement with the district court.
[3] The count alleging misrepresentation (Count II) also underwent a per-

' According to the author of the note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge
The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1816 (1980). two-thirds of the American work force is governed by this rule. Id. at 1816.
Under it, "lejven when an employee has reasonable
grounds for expecting that some degree of job security was part of the deal, the at will rule often
operates to frustrate her expectations." Id. at 1818.
Further. "Icjourts have generally been reluctant to
interfere with the parties' 'freedom to contract'; if
an employee fails to bargain for an express contractual protection against wrongful discharge,
the court will not intervene whether the contract
was terminated 'for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong.' " Id at 1818-19.

mutation, beginning with the allegation that CACI falsely represented
that it would have work for plaintiff in
Bath, Maine, for at least three years,
and ending with the claim that CACI
"failed to inform Broussard of the element which could render all the other
representations meaningless — i.e.,
that he could be arbitrarily terminated without recourse
" (Appellants'
brief, p. 24)
The sum total of the testimony relied
on to create a genuine issue of misrepresentation, extracted from a 300-page
appendix which in turn was distilled
from many more hundreds of pages of
depositions and affidavits, consists of
the following statements: CACI's policy was "plant a garden and then weed
it
and all the cream surfaces to
the top"; "All it takes to remove some
. . . is if his boss wants to and his boss'
boss agrees to it"; and if customers did
not like CACFs employees who dealt
with them, they — the customers —
would have influence in effecting their
discharge.
The issue is whether failure to reveal
these details of CACI's discharge at
will policy is actionable as a halftruth, Restatement (Second) of Torts
§529 (1977); or a fraudulent concealment, id., §550; Atwood v. Chapman, 68
Me. 38 (1877); cf. Horner v. Flynn, 334
A.2d 194 (Me. 1975).
The district court distinguished
Wildes v. Pens Unlimited Co., 389 A.2d
837 (Me. 1978), where a putative employer was held liable for concealing
from a salesman being hired the fact
that a reorganization of the company
which would eliminate the salesman's
position was then under way. The district court noted the absence of any
plan to eliminate plaintiff's position
and concluded that "[tjo accept the
plaintiffs' argument of a duty to disclose here would require that every
employer who hires at will affirmatively state its right to terminate arbitrarily."
We do not say that there may not be
extreme situations where the record of
arbitrary and irresponsible firing is so
egregious that failure to disclose it
would constitute fraudulent concealment. But there is no such record here.
Plaintiff's predecessor was discharged
not on a superior's whim but for unsatisfactory performance after several
trips by CACI officials had been made
to Bath to try to help him. And for
CACI, a consulting company dependent on the good will of the government
agencies it serves, to be sensitive to
customer complaints is not surpris-
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ABRAMOVICH V. PA. LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD

ing. J At worst the nondisclosure in
this record is that of a policy hospitable to firing on the complaint of a
customer, cushioned against the whim
of one person by the requirement that
two supervisors join in the action. In
other words, the policy is that of discharge at will, taken seriously.
The problem is that, if the nondisclosure described here is held to raise a
genuine issue of fraudulent concealment, this would be an open-ended invitation to litigation of the issue in
almost every case of a discharge at
will. We would not know how to draw a
line between failure to state the law of
at will discharges — which would not
be actionable — and failure to state
how a company applies this law —
which would be actionable. We therefore hold that the statements we have
cited do not constitute sufficiently
substantial evidence to create a "genuine" issue of material fact. H a h n v.
Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.
1975).
We affirm the judgments on both
Counts I and II and, accordingly, do
not reach Counts VI and VII, claiming
negligent infliction of emotional distress and seeking punitive damages.
Affirmed.

CENTRAL HARDWARE v.
CENTRAL STATES
U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eithth Circuit (St. Louis)
CENTRAL HARDWARE
COMPANY, etc. v. CENTRAL STATES
SOUTHWEST AREAS
PENSION
FUND, et al., Nos. 84-2158 and 84-2297,
November 8, 1985
On petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc of 120 LRRM 3029,
770 F.2d 106. Denied.
Full Text of Order
Petition for rehearing en banc filed
by Central Hardware Company, has
been considered by the Court and is
denied.
Judges Donald R. Ross and Pasco M.
Bowman would have granted the petition.
Petition for rehearing by the panel is
also denied.

ABRAMOVICH v. PA. LIQUOR
CONTROL BOARD
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

DONOVAN v. ROSE LAW FIRM
U.S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit (St. Louis)
DONOVAN, etc. v. THE ROSE LAW
FIRM, No. 84-1863-EA, December 27,
1985
On petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc of 119 LRRM 3345.
Denied.
Full Text of Order
Appellee's petition for rehearing en
banc has been considered by the Court
and is denied.
Judges Donald P. Lay, Gerald W.
Heaney, Theodore McMillian and
George G. Fagg would have granted
the petition.
Petition for rehearing by the panel is
also denied.

5
The record in the instant case contains extensive deposition testimony that at a minimum the
following persons were disturbed by the newspaper
article based on plaintiff's interview that caused
his firing: a Navy Captain, three Navy Commanders, and six Navy civil servants.

ABRAMOVICH, individually and
trading as ABRAMS
STORAGE
COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD,
No. 556 D.C. 1984, December 28, 1984
CONTRACTS
Collective bargaining — State liquor
board — Adjustment of rates •24.55
•114.22
Storage company, which was awarded contract with state liquor control
board to store, handle, and transport
liquor and other supplies, was not required to enter into collective bargaining contracts with unions whose members worked for company
that
previously held liquor contract, and
therefore provision in liquor contract
on "mandatory
requirement" of
change in rate of payment for labor
did not entitle storage company to
readjustment of contractual rate of
payment to cover increased labor costs
under union contracts. Company had
other options available to it, including
filing unfair labor practice charge
with NLRB or petitioning federal district court for appropriate injunctive
relief.
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Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
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Rej
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State v. Dunn. Case No. 17571

Dear Mr. Butler:
During appellant's final oral argument, the Court asked
which party had requested a lesser included instruction on
reckless manslaughter to be given or if defendant had objected to
the giving of such an instruction. I would direct the Court's
attention to the record at T. 527-528 and the supplemental record
of defendant's requested jury instructions, specifically
requested instructions 4, 10, 26, and the requested verdict form.
In response to appellant's letter of May 14th, the
state would ask that the letter be stricken as not in conformity
with rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or in the
alternative, to recognize the letter as a request for
supplemental briefing.
Sincerely,

'^Ok^hyJ^oU^
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
CFS/jn
cc:

Debra J. Moore, Esq.
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